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Abstract 
 
Enterprise risk management (ERM) has recently emerged as a widespread practice in 
financial institutions. It has been increasingly codified and encrypted into regulatory, 
corporate governance and organisational management blueprints. A burgeoning 
literature of regulatory and practitioner texts is indicative of the apparent diversity of 
ambitions, objectives and techniques that constitute the ERM agenda. Making sense of 
these developments is a challenge. This paper presents field-based evidence from two 
large banking organisations suggesting that systematic variations in ERM practices 
exist in the financial services industry. The cases illustrate four risk management ideal 
types and show how they form the ‗risk management mix‘ in a given organisation. 
Further, drawing on the literature of the roles and uses of management control systems 
(MCS), the paper explores how ERM achieved organisational significance in the 
studied settings. The findings are indicative of the current co-existence of alternative 
models of ERM. In particular, two types of ERM models are postulated: one driven by 
a strong shareholder value imperative (ERM by the numbers), the other corresponding 
to the demands of the risk-based internal control imperative (holistic ERM). This paper 
explains the differences in the two risk management mixes pointing towards alternative 
logics of calculation (Power, 2007), which I conceptualise and describe as different 
calculative cultures. The study suggests that calculative cultures, which in these cases 
shaped managerial predilections towards ERM practices, are relevant, albeit so far 
neglected, constituents of the fit between MCS and organizational contexts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‗One of the things we have been struggling with over the last couple of years is how best to integrate 
meaningful high-level risk information into the strategic planning process. … The reason why the risk 
management function is called ‗Strategic‘ is that the purpose should really be top-level coverage.‘  
(Chief Risk Officer, Strategic Risk Management, Gotebank) 
 
‗Most of the people doing strategy [and planning] don‘t understand risk. Most of the risk people don‘t 
understand strategy. …People who do strategy [and planning] know they have to work out economic 
profit and they know they have to work out how much risk is involved, but they are not very interested 
in it.  They are more interested in income and what is going to happen to the market place. They don‘t 
want to get involved with risk all the time. The risk people spend all this time on calculating how much 
risk they have got and they don‘t look at the bigger picture. Getting both sides to talk to each other is the 
hard part.‘ 
(Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank) 
 
 
Making risk management strategic is a common pledge vowed by a string of chief 
executives who are currently taking the helm at troubled banking enterprises, weighed 
under the highest losses reported in recent credit history. The importance of making 
risk management ‗count‘ in high level strategic decisions is perhaps the most agreed 
upon lesson that industry actors are taking from the current credit crisis.
 
As the Wall 
Street Journal commented on 15 November 2007: ‗After an era of go-go growth that 
led firms into profitable but chancy areas like mortgage securities, the industry is 
moving toward the kind of leader who gets down into the nitty-gritty of risk 
management.‘  
 
Indeed, the rise of risk management in recent years has drawn attention by several 
commentators who have been marvelling at the increasing spread and codification of 
risk practices under the term enterprise risk management (ERM). Noting the ‗risk 
management explosion‘, in 2003 Michael Power proposed that ERM might have 
emerged as a ‗world model‘: ‗If we were to imagine the creation of a new banking 
organization, we know that it could not be founded without rapidly adopting the 
mission and principles of ERM.‘ (Power, 2003a: 10.) International bank capital 
regulation and corporate governance are two areas where the prominence of ERM was 
particularly ubiquitous. The Basel Committee, leading the reform of banking 
supervision, endorsed enterprise risk management as an umbrella notion that can 
accommodate the techniques required for bank capital adequacy calculation: 
‗…integrated firm-wide approaches to risk management should continue to be strongly 
encouraged by the regulatory and supervisory community.‘ (BIS, 2003b: 2.) 
 
Many banks have adopted the mission and principles of ERM 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005, 2007; Deloitte, 2007). Yet we know little of how 
enterprise risk management works in action. Several questions are unanswered. What 
do risk managers do and what functional and structural arrangements organise their 
activities? What degree of organizational significance do risk managers conduct? How 
are risk control systems used by decision makers?  Similar questions are being asked in 
the wake of the current crisis of confidence in the risk management capabilities of 
banks implicated in the credit debacle (Treasury Committee, 2007a, 2007b). As 
regulators and policymakers search for the answer in the spotlight of media and public 
scrutiny, this paper looks behind the scenes of risk management in its actual 
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organizational settings, to examine the organizational processes through which the 
‗risk voice‘ is made influential, or not, as the case may be. 
 
Risk techniques were developed by financial institutions to address the issue of capital 
adequacy (how much capital cushion should a bank hold?) and the internal allocation 
of capital to business units (how much capital should individual business units carry?). 
The amount of capital reserved by banks is a key regulatory and managerial concern in 
the financial services industry. Risk techniques determine adequate capital 
requirements in proportion to the amount of risk taken, suggesting that banks should 
reserve more capital for higher risk-businesses and carry less capital for less risky 
ventures. Not derived from accounting principles, but from ‗economic calculations‘ of 
risk, the risk-based capital amounts rarely coincide with the traditional accounting 
capital figures that banks carry in their books.  
 
The risk-based capital calculations are furthered by a new controller group, risk 
managers, as internal representations of risk profiles, complementary to accounting 
capital. Risk capital calculations may or may not get acted upon and put into action to 
determine actual capital allocations in the course of the planning process. In case they 
do, they add a new facet to accountability. Risk-based capital allocations open the 
possibility for capturing the so called risk-adjusted returns that individual business 
units (or a group of companies) earn. Their technical novelty is that the accounting 
capital amounts used in the performance metrics are replaced by the risk capital 
allocations: thus, risk-adjusted return represents a departure from, and a 
complementary performance measure to, traditional accounting metrics.  
 
Given that the suggested applications of ERM in financial institutions belong to the 
realm of financial decision making and management control, it is somewhat puzzling 
that accounting researchers have so far given little attention to the subject. All the 
same, the literature of management control systems can help us make sense of 
enterprise risk management. In return, the existing body of work on management 
controls should be enriched by exploring ERM as another facet of organisational 
control and accountability. The common area of interest is the roles and organizational 
significance of calculative practices.  
 
Twenty years ago accounting was viewed mostly as a technical subject and little was 
known of ‗the organizational processes … through which the technical achieves its 
potential‘ (Hopwood, 1983: 291). Recognising this, a number of important manifestos 
called for an organizational, rather than a singularly technical approach to accounting 
research (Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood, 1983). Subsequent studies illuminated the 
roles that calculative practices play and the intended and unintended consequences 
they have. These studies can be called upon in the course of exploring and scrutinising 
the roles and organizational significance of risk management.   
 
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, it conceptualises and synthesizes the 
diverse practices described by the normative literature on ERM. Second, based on 
notions developed in the management control literature of how calculative practices 
achieve organisational significance, and extensive field evidence, the paper explores 
the forms and uses of ERM and the roles that risk managers have come to play in 
actual organizational settings.   
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The focus on banks has a caveat emptor: Risk management here (supposedly) 
addresses the question of bank capital adequacy, which is a regulatory requirement not 
faced by non-financial institutions. As the observed risk managers, however, will be 
shown to have wider objectives, and try to become involved in strategic planning, 
performance management and control, the study has implications for all risk managers 
who cast their nets wide and cultivate strategic control ambitions.  These cases may 
have implications for not only banking specialists, but also for the theory and practice 
of enterprise risk management in general, as a corporate governance and management 
control discipline. 
 
A significant challenge for new control systems rising to organisational significance is 
the need to establish their own voice and language in order to provide organisational 
debates with their representation of economic motive and possibilities for action 
(Hopwood, 1987; Roberts, 1990; Dent, 1991; Scapens and Roberts, 1993). In these 
studies accounting is shown to command organizational significance through the force 
of its ‗language‘, which enables users to shape organizational agendas, direct scarce 
top managerial attention and mobilize action. The studies also highlight that different 
control systems are being furthered by different occupational and functional groups, 
who compete for ‗dominance‘ over other control groups in influencing decision 
making at various organizational forums.  In these struggles, the language of control 
becomes significant and, possibly, a source of power. As Dutton (1997) notes, ‗in an 
organizational context, intentional and unintentional usage of language to frame an 
issue mobilizes different groups of managers to invest in the issue. These framings, in 
turn, reflect different understandings of an issue and result in different patterns of 
attention allocation.‘ (Dutton, 1997: 90.)  
  
Perhaps nowhere is the ‗usage of language‘ as prevalent as in current developments in 
the risk management discipline. The spectrum of techniques ranges from statistical loss 
estimating tools, shrouded in analytical mystique to more descriptive, judgmental 
‗mappings‘ of risks into probability-impact matrices. Given that risk management in 
financial services firms is advocated in both forms (as a highly analytical loss-
prediction tool as well as a ‗strategic‘ risk mapping tool) its take-up rate and uses must, 
to a great extent, depend on top management‘s appetite for, or resistance to, highly 
analytical (or highly judgemental) information systems. Consequently, while a risk 
modelling technique might be successfully adopted in a highly analytics-friendly 
management culture, it might fail to resonate with one that takes a more cautious, 
incredulous approach to the benefits of quantitative modelling.  
 
Accordingly, this paper emphasises the role of alternative logics of calculation (Power, 
2007), which I conceptualise and describe as different calculative cultures. I suggest 
that calculative cultures shape managerial predilections towards ERM practices, and 
serve as important constituents of the fit between risk control systems and 
organizational contexts.  
 
The first organisation (henceforth referred to as Gotebank) possessed an ERM function 
that corresponded to a highly sceptical top managerial attitude to risk quantification 
(ERM adherents as quantitative sceptics). Here the computational role of risk 
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techniques was underplayed, and emphasis fell on their use as a learning tool. Senior 
risk officers acquired power to set board-level agendas and assumed a role in high-
level strategic decision making. Their ambition was to restrain excessive risk-taking 
resulting from expansionist business strategies. The remit of ERM included ‗strategic‘ 
and ‗operational‘ issues that were not necessarily quantifiable, but were perceived as 
threats to key strategic objectives.  
 
The second organisation (henceforth Fraser Bank) was driven by a strong enthusiasm 
for risk quantification (ERM adherents as quantitative enthusiasts).  A consensus 
agreement was built around the ability of risk numbers to reflect the underlying risk 
profiles. This case evidences risk management not only as a tool of computation, but 
also as ammunition to diverse organisational actors who mobilised risk numbers in the 
process of negotiating intra-group capital allocations.  Thereby risk managers became 
involved in the strategic planning and performance measurement process. However, 
risk people were excluded from the discussion of non-quantifiable strategic and 
operational issues and were denied influence on discretionary strategic decisions. 
 
 
2. Setting the scene  
 
Management control innovations as assemblies of practices 
 
Raising an important milestone on the road of corporate governance developments, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
defined ERM as 
 
‗… a process, effected by an entity‘s board of directors, management 
and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.‘ (COSO, 
2004: 6.) 
 
This description calls into mind Anthony‘s widely-quoted definition of management 
control: ‗the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization‘s objectives.‘ 
(Anthony, 1965:17) With the emphasis placed on the strategic role of ERM (‗applied 
in strategy setting… to provide … assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives‘), ERM is being advocated as a strategic management control system. Thus 
ERM echoes the ambitions of such management control practices as value-based 
management, activity-based management and the balanced scorecard.  
 
A common feature of recent control system innovations is that they constitute an 
assembly of practices. Various normative techniques and conceptual innovations are 
being advocated under the umbrella of the very same management control concept, as 
observed by empirical-conceptual studies of the Activity Management assembly 
(Gosselin, 1997) and in the evolution of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 
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1992, 1996, 2001, 2004; also summarized as an evolution by Speckbacher et al. 
2003).
2
 
 
In a given organisation, various risk management practices form a constellation, a risk 
management mix that corresponds to the particularities of the organisation and its 
context.  
 
 
2.2. Patterns in the use of management controls 
 
The strand of organizationally grounded management control studies (Hopwood, 1987; 
Dent, 1987; Simons, 1990, 1991; Ahrens, 1996; Chapman, 1998; Mouritsen, 1999; 
Bhimani, 2003) suggests that systematic variations in ERM practices may exist. 
Similarly, the roles and uses of risk management practices can be diverse and 
contingent. Burchell et al. (1980) provides a powerful conceptualization of the roles 
that accounting (and calculative practices in general) may plausibly play in 
organizational settings. They postulated four ways in which accounting can be 
constitutive of organizational decision making: (1) accounting as a tool of 
computation, (2) accounting control as a facilitator of learning, (3) accounting as an 
information system providing ‗ammunition‘ to competing organizational fractions in 
budgeting and performance discussions, and (4) accounting as a post-hoc 
rationalization of  intuitively made decisions.  Empirical studies such as Ezzamel and 
Bourn (1990) and Abernethy and Brownell (1999) have applied this framework to 
illuminate the roles of accounting information systems in organizations experiencing 
financial crisis and strategic change, respectively.  
 
Burchell et al. (1980) is a useful starting point for the discussion of the roles and 
organizational uses of enterprise risk management. The practitioner risk literature 
suggests that developments in risk quantification allow risk people to measure and 
aggregate risks. However, the field-studies presented here show that many 
organizational actors consider risk to belong to realms beyond computation, and 
mobilize risk controls to serve other ends such as learning and ‗ammunition‘ to capital 
allocation debates. Further, with senior risk officers claiming access to non-
quantifiable risk issues that clearly lie outside the scope of computational decision 
making, even risk people are divided in their reliance on, and use of, quantified risk 
methodologies.  
 
                                                          
2
 Gosselin (1997) defines Activity Management as the effective and consistent organisation of 
activities via three levels of practices: activity analysis (AA), activity cost analysis (ACA) and 
Activity Based Costing (ABC). The control assembly is defined so that later levels subsume 
the previous ones. Speckbacher et al. (2003) describes the evolution of the Balanced 
Scorecard pointing to three types of BSC. Type I is the original Kaplan and Norton (1992, 
1996) concept of a performance measurement system that encompasses the financial as well 
as the non-financial aspects of performance. Type II is a strategic performance measurement 
system that describes strategy via cause-effect relationships, as in Kaplan and Norton (2001). 
Type III is a strategic management system that does not only map the strategy into 
performance measures, but also furthers strategy implementation by linking it to incentives. 
Speckbacher et al. (2003) and Gosselin (1997) provide empirical evidence that adopters 
systematically vary according to which of the various types of BSC or Activity Management 
practices they implemented.   
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Simons (1990, 1991) deepens our understanding of the roles and uses of management 
control systems and how they might acquire organizational significance. Interactively 
used calculative practices lie at the heart of strategic control and are constitutive of 
strategy formulation, as top managers, by using control systems interactively, actively 
foster the emergence of new strategies from grass-root initiatives. Other control 
practices that are used diagnostically only receive top management attention when 
outcomes fall outside predetermined control limits.
3
 Linking Burchell at al. (1980) with 
Simons (1990, 1991), I argue that management controls may acquire strategic 
significance both in an interactive and a diagnostic capacity. If interactive controls 
indeed address the key strategic uncertainties and foster organizational learning, they 
guide decision makers‘ judgment under ambiguity (as ‗learning machines‘ do in 
Burchell et al., 1980).  The significance of interactive controls is that they make 
various organizational actors aware of emergent risks, and thereby shape both high-
level discretionary decisions and emergent strategies.  Diagnostic controls, which top 
management regard as relevant and reliable in their ‗computation‘ role, can become 
part of the performance evaluation system. Linked to incentive systems, diagnostic 
controls can be very powerful as they will shape organizational motivations, 
behaviours and agendas. 
 
The field studies presented here show how risk controls became an integral part of the 
management process (i.e. strategic planning, performance measurement and 
discretionary strategic decision making), albeit selectively. The case of Gotebank 
demonstrates the interactive use of certain risk controls. These risk controls were 
organizationally significant in the sense that they genuinely received top managerial 
attention and shaped the decision making agenda. The case of Fraser Bank showed 
how risk controls became significant in a diagnostic capacity in a context where no 
risk controls were used interactively. Here risk controls became integral to the 
performance measurement process, in a way the same risk tools were not at Gotebank. 
By measuring risk-adjusted performance, Fraser‘s diagnostic risk controls influenced 
the budgeting process. Such differences in the forms and uses of the observed risk 
control practices call for an examination of the contextual drivers. 
 
 
2.3. The role of managerial context 
 
Risk management tools tend to be highly analytical, data-driven techniques. These are 
likely to strike a different chord in different managerial cultures. Bhimani (2003) finds 
that crucial to the perceived success of a management information system innovation is 
the alignment between the cultural premise of the new control system and the 
predilections of intended users for the particular numerical and procedural approach. 
Indeed, when considering the merits and limitations of risk management tools, 
Gotebank‘s  senior risk officers held remarkably different views from those held by 
their peers at Fraser Bank. 
 
                                                          
3
 Simons (1990, 1991, 1994) argues that accounting and other control systems may be designed and 
used with a dual objective: first, to help strategy implementation, and second, to foster organizational 
learning and guide the emergence of new, grass-roots strategies. His empirical study of the US health 
care products industry shows that top managers design and select control systems to complementary 
ends: diagnostic and interactive use.  
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To explicate these differences in user predilections, I introduce the notion of 
calculative cultures, capturing senior managerial attitudes towards the use and 
limitations of highly analytical calculative practices in an organization. Distinguishing 
between calculative idealism and calculative pragmatism, Power (2003b and 2007) 
helps us to conceptualize very different managerial attitudes towards analytical 
models. My objective is to empirically explore and conceptually develop these notions 
in order to capture the salient managerial attitudes towards the highly analytical 
calculative technologies discussed here. I argue that, given their institutional and 
professional backgrounds and through initial encounters with ERM practices, senior 
risk officers develop personal philosophies about the manageability of risks, and shape 
the composition of the risk management mix accordingly. Thus a particular calculative 
culture both influences and is influenced by senior managers‘ choice and use of 
analytical models.  
 
Under calculative idealism, adherents aim to manage risk ‗by the numbers‘, replacing 
judgmental risk assessments with risk quantification. Adherents (henceforth 
quantitative enthusiasts) tend to agree that risk measures are capable of reflecting the 
underlying economic reality well enough to induce requisite economic behaviours in 
the light of these. Therefore they put a high priority on building, maintaining and 
improving the ‗robustness‘ and accuracy of their analytical models.  
Under the alternative logic of calculation, calculative pragmatism, adherents place a 
much lesser degree of ‗trust in numbers‘ (Porter, 1995) produced by risk analytics. 
They (henceforth quantitative sceptics) regard risk figures as trend indicators, which 
they seek to complement, and often overwrite by senior managerial discretion, 
experience and judgment. Quantitative sceptics are weary of promoting risk control as 
an ‗answer machine‘ (Burchell et al., 1980). For them risk control is akin to a devil‘s 
advocate system, to be mobilized in order to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions 
and foster organizational learning.  
 
Given that top management‘s personal philosophies about the manageability of risks 
are shaped by their institutional backgrounds (Mikes, 2007), our exploration must take 
note of the potential influence of external institutional pressures on the selection and 
use of ERM practices. In this paper I detect these influences indirectly, through their 
mark on particular ERM practices in the normative literature. The agents and 
discourses through which the normative institutional requirements are mediated into 
the organisational choices were outside the scope of the study.  Nevertheless, two 
powerful contemporary corporate governance concerns will be implicated in the 
analysis of normative ERM practices: the shareholder value drive and the risk-based 
internal control imperative. These represent different approaches to corporate 
governance. The shareholder value drive emphasises the role of control systems in the 
measurement of shareholder value, and advocates control practices that are designed 
explicitly to promote value creation. The adherents of the risk-based internal control 
imperative further control practices that are designed around the wider strategic 
objectives of the firm, including the non-financial aspects of performance. The focus is 
on maintaining appropriate business conduct and accountability. Advocates pursue the 
achievement of these objectives via internal (formal and informal) controls, designed 
over processes that constitute risks to these objectives. 
 
The proposed discussion framework (summarized in Figure 1) brings together a 
number of elements that the case presentations will explicate. The analytical challenge 
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of the paper is to draw upon these elements and show how they fit together and create 
a plausible story that explains the variations found in the design and use of the two risk 
management mixes. This framework helps one to describe a particular constellation 
between ERM practices, and their uses and roles in a given managerial context. 
However, this type of study (referred to as ‗Type 1‘ contingency study in Fisher, 1998) 
must be particularly cautious about suggesting causality or equilibrium implications. 
My interest is in tracing associations, leaving open the possibility that calculative 
cultures can be constituents, and at the same time constituted of, the particular forms 
and uses of the control systems observed. 
 
 
Figure 1. The risk management mix -  elements of explanation 
 
2.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The field-study companies referred to as Gotebank and Fraser Bank are typical of the 
large financial organisations that had embarked on risk management projects seeking 
control not only over individual risk types and the capital adequacy of the bank, but 
also over the strategy and the risk taking capacity of their business units.  
 
The site-selection process was not random. Both banks had a reputation of having 
‗leading edge‘ risk management organisations. Their balance sheet size was similar, so 
was the scope of their business activities, spreading from retail banking to corporate, 
investment banking and wealth management services. Fraser Bank differed in an 
important aspect – it was an ardent advocate and practitioner of value-based 
management (VBM), which had implications for the design and use of its risk 
management systems.  Gotebank, on the other hand, was not known to practice a 
value-based management ethos. During the process of negotiating access to the 
organisations it emerged that the presence of VBM in one bank (and the lack of it in 
the other) allows the study to explore organisations in apparently similar circumstances 
following different management policies and using different systems. The use of 
contrasting observations from multiple cases is not alien to field-based accounting 
research (Ahrens, 1997). By drawing out similarities and contrasts between ‗matched 
Roles and uses  
•Diagnostic / Interactive 
•Computation / Learning /  
Lobbying / Rationalising 
 
Management control form 
(selection of practices from 
relevant assembly) e.g. 
• Risk management mix 
 
Institutional pressures 
•Shareholder value 
•Risk-based internal 
control 
Contingency variables 
•Size 
•Age 
•Strategy 
•Technology 
•Environment 
Calculative cultures 
•Idealism  
(quantitative enthusiasm) 
•Pragmatism 
 (quantitative scepticism) 
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pairs‘ (Ahrens and Dent, 1998), the researcher can move systematically from field 
material through interpretation to explanation. 
 
The primary source of data for the study was seventy-five in-depth interviews with 
senior finance, lending, strategy, controlling (management accounting) and risk 
management staff (see Appendix 1 for a list of the interviews). The second source of 
data was direct observation of risk management in action. Gotebank provided me with 
an office in the central risk management department during my visits so that I could 
observe the staff at work and participate in informal meetings, lunchtime get-togethers 
and chats at the coffee machine. Fraser Bank allowed me to attend an internal risk 
policy workshop, in which they reviewed and discussed their risk management 
framework. Within the boundaries of confidentiality, the banks provided historical and 
other source documents, such as annual reports, presentations and internal reports, 
which constitute an additional supply of data.  
 
As the department at Gotebank was relatively new, and Fraser Bank was then 
undergoing a reorganisation, the risk staff in both banks showed a great interest in the 
study. They were keen to exchange information on how top management and others 
perceived their activities. All in all, the opportunity to be acquainted with a small, but 
significant aspect of life at the banks was there.  
 
The cases analysis is the result of the patterning of the field material, which gradually 
took shape over the research and writing period. I examined and re-examined 
observations and gathered more field material at each stage of the field work, to 
ensure, as far as possible, ‗that the patterns adequately represent the observed world 
and are not merely a product of [the researcher‘s] imagination‘ (Ahrens and Dent, 
1998:9). The point of departure from the field came when, similar to Dent‘s  
experience (Dent, 1991), it became clear that interviewees‘ views were predictable, 
given knowledge of their function (accounting, strategy, risk management etc.). By 
participating in international practitioner events, I found that the roles and perceived 
influence of risk officers from other financial organisations appeared to echo the 
lessons learned from the cases. After completing the two case studies, I conducted 
twenty further interviews to check on the feasibility of the results with a number of 
senior risk officers in banks similar in spread and scope to the ones presented here. It 
appears that the cases of Fraser Bank and Gotebank display relevance for peer 
practitioners, reflecting the field researcher‘s ambition to uphold external validity, as 
suggested by Bruns and Kaplan (1987). 
 
However, ‗instead of speculating directly about the larger population‘ (Atkinson and 
Shaffir, 1998: 62), the ambition of the study is to illuminate the design and uses of risk 
management in situ. The strength of such research (over other approaches trading off 
depth for breadth) is its potential for making significant advances in the conceptual 
development of a managerially relevant phenomenon (Bruns and Kaplan, 1987), in this 
case, the diverse forms and workings of risk management.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section conceptualises ERM as 
an assembly of practices, which can be grouped in four ideal types with reference to 
their institutional origins, techniques and ambitions. Next, presenting the case studies, 
the paper turns to describe and explain developments in the risk management mix of 
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the studied banks. A discussion of the implications for the further development of risk 
management and future research in this area will form the concluding parts. 
 
3. Making sense of enterprise risk management 
 
Normative and technical texts are suggestive of four ideal types of risk management, 
all of which qualify as enterprise-wide, but vary in terms of their focus and purpose. 
 
3.1. Type I: Risk silo management 
 
Over the past decade there have been significant advances in the risk measurement 
capabilities of financial institutions (Garside and Nakada 1999; Marrison 2002). At the 
heart of the practitioner literature‘s most salient risk management ideal type is risk 
quantification, the rendering of an increasing number of risk types susceptible to 
quantification, measurement and control. The discussions of the measurement and 
control of risk tend to cluster around concrete risk types, such as market, credit and 
operational risks. The following commonly quoted definitions apply for the main risk 
categories (Drzik et al., 2004).  Market risk arises from changes in the value of 
financial assets and liabilities due to volatility in market prices (interest rates, 
currencies, equities, commodities). Credit risk arises from changes in the value of 
assets and off-balance sheet exposures due to volatility in default rates or credit 
qualities. Bancassurance firms and insurers add the additional category of insurance 
risk, which arises from volatility of insurance claims around the expected level of 
claims. Operational risk has long been defined as a residual category, one that captures 
all of the risks not covered in the first three categories. 
 
As mastering risk measurement in the various risk silos appears to be the first risk 
control challenge in financial institutions, I express the first ideal type as risk silo 
management, encompassing the measurement and control of risk of various types 
across the organisation.  
 
The most frequently cited technique of risk silo management is value-at-risk (Jorion, 
1997). It is a statistical measure of unanticipated loss, derived from the loss 
distributions of different risk types that institutions track (e.g. market losses, credit 
losses, operational losses, insurance losses). Value-at-risk received critical examination 
from several papers that point out the sensitivity of its results to assumptions made 
about the continuity of historic trends and liquidity levels in financial markets (Engel & 
Gizycki, 1999; Danielsson, 2002). While the concept of value-at-risk is applicable for 
all risk types, other risk silo management models exist to calculate credit and 
operational risk from various additional perspectives. For example tailored credit risk 
models gauge the probability of default and the expected credit loss (Marrison, 2002) in 
various loan portfolios. Operational risk presents risk silo managers with the greatest 
quantitative challenge. Most institutions are still in the early stage of learning about 
operational losses by establishing databases that collect information on risk 
materializations. At this stage only the more frequent operational risks lend themselves 
to modelling. 
 
Nevertheless, advances in risk silo management have increasingly influenced the 
design of the international bank regulatory framework. The so-called Basel rules 
require banks to set aside regulatory capital that must reflect the amount of risk they 
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take, calculated as the aggregate of risks measured in the risk silos. The current 
regulatory framework is being replaced by a new one, Basel II, which recognizes 
recent developments in risk silo management while challenging banks that are lagging 
behind in terms of their risk measurement capabilities. Basel II differs from Basel I in 
two respects. The first difference is in the recognition of risk silos it advocates to be 
measured- along with market and credit risk, it now includes operational risk as well. 
The second difference is in the measurement options that are outlined for banks. These 
stretch the measurement capabilities of even the most advanced banks, especially with 
regard to the advanced measurement approach (AMA) to operational risk. Thus the 
Basel II framework is an important driver of ongoing and further risk silo management 
initiatives within banks.  
 
3.2. Type II: Integrated risk management 
 
Risk aggregation has been a challenge to risk practitioners for a long time. This was 
largely due to the variety of risk measures applied to the different risk silos, and the 
correlations that exist between risks. The recent development of a common 
denominator measure for market, credit and operational risks enables firms to 
aggregate their quantifiable risks into a total risk estimate. The emerging common 
denominator of quantifiable risks is called economic capital. Economic capital (also 
known as economic risk capital) is a statistically estimated amount of capital that could 
be used to cover all liabilities in a severe loss event (given a specific confidence level), 
such as an unexpected market, credit, operational and/or insurance loss. The 
conceptual appeal of economic capital methods, as recognised recently by the 
regulator, is that ‗they can provide a single metric along which all types of risks can be 
measured‘ (BIS, 2003: 6).  
 
Economic capital, as the common denominator for the measurable risk types, creates a 
consistent and comprehensive framework, or at least the appearance of it, in which 
risks can be compared and aggregated, enterprise-wide. Further, economic capital can 
be set to constrain the risk capacity of business initiatives and profit centres, serving as 
a tool for limit setting and control. 
 
The economic capital framework gives rise to a new risk management ideal type, 
integrated risk management. It is defined here as a risk management approach that 
applies the economic capital framework for the measurement, comparison, aggregation 
and control of risks.  
 
The Basel Committee has legitimised the economic capital methodology, recognising 
that it has emerged as best practice among practitioners in the last decade (see for 
example Marrison 2002). But the real institutional force behind the spreading of 
economic capital in the industry is the rating agency community. Banks tailor 
economic capital not to a regulatory standard, but to the capital adequacy expectations 
coming from rating agencies. Economic capital is a proxy of the capital cushion that 
rating agencies expect the bank to possess in order to withstand a large unexpected loss 
and thereby justify its target credit rating.  
 
Given that rating agency opinions concern different banks to different extent, 
economic capital (or its promise) appeals primarily to banks that wish to maintain a 
high credit rating. For example, firms rated AA by S&P have historically defaulted 
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with a 0.03 per cent probability over a one-year horizon. If a bank aims for an AA 
credit rating, then the corresponding capital level (economic capital) is the amount 
required to keep the firm solvent over a one-year period with 99.97 per cent confidence 
(Garside & Nakada 1999). Given that rating agencies apply a higher confidence level 
to the best ratings than regulators do to the general bank population, the corresponding 
economic capital amount is higher than the regulatory minimum.  
 
The influence of the rating agencies is apparent in the widespread industry discussions 
about the potential costs and benefits resulting from alternative compliance strategies. 
In particular, banks can choose between more or less advanced measurement 
approaches in the credit and operational risk areas. It has been believed that banks with 
advanced measurement systems will be able to demonstrate less capital need than 
prescribed as the current minimum regulatory capital requirement. Accordingly, some 
large banks with advanced risk management systems would expect their costly capital 
burden to ease. Rating agencies, however, have their own expectations about bank 
capital adequacy. As a banking industry magazine asserts, ‗without the agencies‘ 
blessing, any capital reductions granted by the regulators will be meaningless.‘ 
(Paletta, 2005:1.) A senior rating agency figure from Moody‘s Investor Service 
observed in 2005: ‗If banks say, ―We are holding all this excess economic capital, and 
we want to eliminate it,‖ that could certainly increase the risk profile of the bank.‘ 
(Paletta, 2005:1.) A representative of Standard & Poor‘s made similar comments: ‗If a 
bank is at an A rating level, and they substantially decapitalize from there, its rating 
could drop.‘ (Paletta, 2005:1.) As suggested before, for some banks the rating agency 
expectations are as binding as regulatory ones. 
 
Thus the role of the rating agencies as quasi-regulators extends beyond the 
enforcement of minimum capital adequacy rules. In some cases, the agencies provide 
and impose strict capital expectations and extra scrutiny. 
 
3.3. Type III: Risk-based management 
 
Recent works in the risk management literature advocate the idea of using risk-based 
internal capital allocations for performance measurement and control. The possibility 
of introducing risk-based performance measurement in banks has emerged as a result 
of developments in risk quantification and risk aggregation. It also appears to coincide 
with the rise of the shareholder value concept in corporate rhetoric (Arnold & Davies 
2000; Hunt 2003). 
 
The type of risk management that is able to feed these ambitions has gone well beyond 
the original remit of risk silo management or even that of integrated risk management. 
It is put forward as the third risk management ideal type, risk-based management, its 
distinguishing aspect being a strong shareholder value rhetoric.  
 
Although the concept of shareholder value (or as it was previously referred to, 
residual income) dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, its wide-spread 
incorporation into management thinking has only recently gained momentum. This is 
largely to do with the influence of business schools and consulting firms that are 
advocating shareholder value and value based management (VBM; the revival of the 
residual income concept is often associated with Stern et al 1995). The core and 
driving principle of VBM is that firms create shareholder value by earning returns in 
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excess of the cost of capital. Against the backdrop of the rise of the shareholder value 
imperative, a similar shift took place in the stakeholder concerns surrounding financial 
institutions. Here too, the emphasis has moved from growth to shareholder value 
creation.  As Molyneux (2000) observes, ‗The strategic priority in banking has shifted 
away from growth and size alone towards a greater emphasis on profitability, 
performance and value creation.‘ (Molyneux, 2000: 218.) 
 
The application of VBM in large financial institutions requires the allocation of 
capital to centres of accountability (for example, to business units), and then the 
measurement of their performance relative to the capital allocations (Hall 2002; 
Marrison 2002; Jameson 2001; Haubenstock & Morisano 2000). Theoretically, risk-
based management offers two broad approaches to risk-based performance 
measurement in banks. The ratio approach defines ‗risk-adjusted return on capital‘ 
(RAROC) as a ratio that relates risk-adjusted profit to economic capital. The 
shareholder value added approach calculates the shareholder value added (also 
known as economic profit) as the residual income left after subtracting a charge on 
economic capital from net profit. Given that capital allocations supposedly reflect 
risk taking, in both cases the performance of business units is measured relative to 
the quantifiable risk they incur. Pushing these performance measurements down to 
business units, products and even transactions gave rise to further potentially value-
enhancing practices, such as risk pricing, risk transfer and portfolio risk management 
(as in Lam 1999).  
 
The joint consideration of risk and profitability in a common performance 
measurement framework is an application of VBM that is specific to the financial 
services sector. At the same time, it represents an application of risk management that 
is equally specific – risk-based management may be favoured by certain banks, while 
doomed to fail in others.  
 
There is some case study evidence on VBM implementations from major British, 
Dutch and US banks (Davies, 2000 on Lloyds TSB; Bruggnik & Buck, 2002 on 
Rabobank; Barton et al., 2002 on Chase Manhattan). The cases focus on the calculative 
and project management aspects of risk-based performance measurement 
implementations. These studies, however, belong to the consulting research genre in 
the sense that they advocate ideas (about the integration of VBM and risk 
management) to the readers. Although they possess a strong concern with practical 
problems and applications, their characteristic ‗prescriptive and propagating style‘ 
(Lukka and Granlund, 2002: 168) curtails their ability to provide a rigorous analysis of 
the nature, functioning, effects and controversies of the described risk practices. 
 
 Type IV: Holistic risk management 
 
We have seen how the ascent of the shareholder value concept gave rise to a specific 
ideal type of risk management, risk-based management. This section focuses on the 
impact of another powerful notion, heralded by corporate governance advocates, that 
of risk-based internal control.  
 
The reports from the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2004) and the Turnbull 
Committee (ICAEW, 1999), both considered as important milestones of Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance, advocate ERM as a framework for capturing risks that are 
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material from the point of view of the achievement of the strategic objectives of the 
enterprise. Apart from the measurable risk silos, this conception of ERM encompasses 
risks that cannot be readily quantified or aggregated. These non-quantifiable risks 
include, for example, the risks of strategic failure, environmental risks, reputational 
risks and operational risks that materialise only rarely. Recent developments in 
corporate governance have emphasised the importance of monitoring and managing 
these risks.  
 
As a result, there have been calls for the risk management framework to be gradually 
expanded to incorporate non-quantifiable risks in addition to those that can be 
quantified. Accordingly, a growing number of practitioners and commentators are 
recasting the discussion of strategic, IT, legal and compliance issues as distinct, 
additional risk categories (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). This version of ERM has got a broader, extended and 
general mandate – I define it as the fourth risk management ideal type: holistic risk 
management.  
 
The management of non-quantifiable risks is not statistics-based. Advocates talk of the 
role of judgment, experience and intuition, comparing it to strategic decision making. 
Some recommended techniques, such as scenario analysis and decision tree methods, 
are borrowed from the strategy and decision making literature (Pickford 2001). Others, 
such as risk mapping, risk self-assessments and special risk reviews, have their origin 
in internal audit.  
To sum up, this section has outlined four types of risk management that all have 
‗enterprise-wide‘ ambitions. A summary of the discussion is presented in Table 1.  
 
 Risk Silo 
Management 
Integrated 
Risk Management 
Risk-based 
Management 
Holistic 
Risk Management 
Institutional 
background 
International 
regulation of  
bank capital  
adequacy 
Rating agency  
expectations  
of bank capital  
adequacy 
Rise of the 
shareholder  
value imperative 
The rise of risk-based 
 internal control  
(Anglo-Saxon and German  
corporate governance) 
Related 
theme in the 
literature 
Risk quantification Risk aggregation 
Risk-based  
performance 
Measurement 
The management of  
non-quantifiable risks 
Focus on 
Measurement and 
control of risk silos; 
Calculation of  
minimum regulatory  
capital; 
Tuning capital  
to the regulatory 
standard 
Assigning a common 
denominator of risk 
to the risk silos  
(economic capital); 
Fine-tuning capital 
to a given solvency  
standard; 
Risk limit setting 
Calculation of  
shareholder value 
created; 
Linking risk  
management with 
performance 
measurement 
 
Inclusion of 
non-quantifiable risks  
into the risk 
management  
framework; 
Providing senior  
management with a  
‗strategic view‘ of risks 
 
Techniques 
Loss distributions; 
Value-at-Risk; 
Credit rating models; 
Standardised and  
Advanced 
measurement 
approaches set 
by regulators 
Economic capital 
Risk-adjusted Return on 
Capital (RAROC); 
Shareholder value added; 
Risk pricing; 
Risk transfer; 
Portfolio risk  
management 
Scenario analysis; 
Sensitivity analyses; 
Control self  
assessment; 
Special risk reviews 
 
Table 1. Four ideal types of enterprise risk management 
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The literature review presented ERM as an assembly of risk management ideal types. 
Exploring the risk management mix in the field (to which we turn in the remainder of 
the paper) will require us to appreciate the dynamics of management control 
assemblies. In particular, the conceptual clustering of techniques within the same 
assembly offers practitioners opportunities for selective implementation, revision and 
switching between the different sub-groups of techniques (Gosselin, 1997).  
 
It will be shown how selective ERM implementations and revisions took place in both 
organizations. Although both bank‘s risk practices included elements of risk silo 
management and the economic capital methodology, two very different patterns 
emerged. Gotebank‘s risk management mix was found at its most influential through 
senior risk officers‘ promotion of holistic risk management. Fraser Bank went down 
the path of implementing risk-based management, thus risk management achieved 
organizational significance through its integration with the planning and performance 
measurement process. Interestingly, holistic risk management and risk-based 
management were found mutually exclusive: where one dominated, the other 
archetype was frustrated. This suggests that the cases might be illustrative of diverging 
trajectories for the implementation of ERM in the financial services industry. 
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4. Enterprise risk management in action: the case of Gotebank
4
 
 
4.1. Introduction, contingency factors and institutional pressures 
 
Gotebank Group consisted of two major banking businesses: an investment bank and a 
commercial bank. The latter arm of the group (called Gotebank) is the focus of this 
section; it contained five business units: retail banking, private banking, corporate 
lending, asset management and insurance. The risk management function was 
organised in three risk silos (Market, Credit and Operational Risk Controlling) and 
there was an additional unit responsible for the calculation and reporting of economic 
risk capital (ERC). In late 2002, at the time of my first visits, risk silo officers were all 
engaged in developing new risk management techniques. Risk capital officers had just 
devised the economic capital methodology, with ERC as its flagship technique. Capital 
and value-based management were discussed by risk officers and senior management. 
The Chief Risk Officer (henceforth also CRO) disclosed a diagram of the remit of risk 
management in the 2002 annual report that showed non-quantifiable risks as part of his 
function‘s scope.  
 
This surge of risk projects was partially to do with the then fresh initiative to 
harmonise risk management practices across the group. After a number of high-profile 
mergers in the late 1990s, Gotebank Group was consolidating its risk systems by 
implementing a blueprint devised by its investment banking arm.  
 
However, Gotebank was also suffering a downturn in its profitability. An innovative, 
entrepreneurial bank, Gotebank was known for its bold acquisitions and first- mover 
strategies. But its spectacular growth was punctuated by losses and halts from time to 
time. At the time of the study, a major and lasting stock market slump seriously hurt a 
large business unit, Division X. The group reported significant losses and disappointed 
shareholders for two consecutive years.  
 
Perceiving considerable regulatory and shareholder pressure, Gotebank updated its 
risk management systems and signalled to both internal and external stakeholders that 
it had got a grip on the situation,
5
 and, in particular, with its troubled business unit, 
Division X. In the early 2000s, there was talk at the group level of an imminent VBM 
implementation. However, in the wake of the dawning financial problems of the group, 
VBM had been taken off the agenda.  
 
4.2.  The roles of risk management at Gotebank  
 
The three risk silo sub-departments had a shared mission: to ‗act as the independent 
“risk conscience” and policy enforcer for [Gotebank] for all risks that could have a 
material impact on the firm in an integrated and comprehensive fashion.‘6 
 
This mission statement carries multiple ambitions: apart from the exercise of risk silo 
management, the aspiration of integrated risk management (‗integrated and 
comprehensive‘) as well as that of holistic risk management (dealing with ‗all risks 
that could have a material impact‘) are present. In order to understand the use and 
                                                          
4
 GOTEBANK is a pseudonym for reasons of confidentiality.  
5
 Literally – GOTEBANK had issued Group Risk Processes and Standards, abbreviated as GRIPS. 
6
 GOTEBANK internal document. 
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balance of these risk management types in the mix, we need to have a closer look at 
the developments of the practices within.  
 
Market risk controllers saw their role in providing a service to traders, with whom they 
were housed together, in separate offices from all other risk silos. At the start of my 
fieldwork, the development of value-at-risk for non-conventional investment products 
was the major preoccupation in the market risk silo. The Head of Market Risk 
Controlling explained:   
 
It is not my job to decide whether or not we should make a deal. It has never 
happened that traders cannot take a deal because we are not able to calculate a 
risk. We are helping them to understand what they do. … I see myself as 
providing a service for the traders and the treasurers. 
 
Market risk specialists saw their challenge in the quantification and tracking of risk 
that the traders took; however, the Head of Market Risk Controlling remained 
cautious about the interpretation of their measurements: 
 
Do you think the risk management tools are really accurate? The value-at-risk 
model, particularly for Alternative Investments, is based on a lot of assumptions. I 
was always afraid that we go for the accuracy of the risk that we have recognised 
and do not realise that there are huge risks, which are not covered at all.  
 
During an afternoon spent observing the work of the members of the market risk team, 
I came across a chart, which showed an increasing trend of market value-at-risk, with a 
step function of the limits climbing up in parallel. I showed this chart to several risk 
people. The Chief Risk Officer‘s response revealed that risk control involved much 
learning and judgment on the part of the controllers:  
 
AM: I saw this chart about the VaR limits on Alternative Investments. (Draws.) 
When I saw it, my first reaction was, oh my god… 
CRO: …they don‘t respect the risk limit, the limit just tracks the risk? 
AM: Exactly. 
CRO: (Smiles.) First, this is still part of the overall limit that has been accepted 
by the Board – that has never been exceeded. It [the overall limit] is 
relatively large. The one you were looking at is a sort of sub-limit. If you 
look at those positions, I would not call them trading positions as such 
because it is not the trader who decides whether he wants to have them or 
not. But I think the environment is relatively stable and we understand the 
dynamics. If we go back to that chart, the big question is to what extent 
you actually understand the dynamics of the beast you are looking at. If 
you have a very good understanding of the beast, then probably a 
thermostat approach is not bad. 
 
Even though value-at-risk techniques were developed for setting risk limits, tracking 
exposure and triggering timely intervention, Gotebank‘s risk controllers were not 
convinced that the tool was able to accurately reflect the underlying risk exposure and 
its dynamics. Such cause-and-effect ambiguities deny calculative practices the role of 
computation (Burchell et al., 1980), and challenge them with an alternative role– that 
of learning. Indeed, Gotebank‘s risk controllers regarded risk measurement tools as a 
‗learning machine‘.  
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Risk control as ‗learning about the beast‘ is more fluid than containing risk within pre-
set limits. At times of strategic expansion, it implied slackening off on risk limits and 
allowing the business-side to increase risk origination. Further, on the part of risk 
officers, it also involved orchestrating timely attention swings, in case risk taking 
should be contained. Nonetheless, the losses that punctuated Gotebank‘s overall 
growth trend showed just how difficult it was to orchestrate timely swings between the 
expansionist profit strategies and periodic control attempts at trimming back risk 
exposure. The CRO commented:  
 
I believe in the quality of our risk management function, absolutely. But you 
have to be honest enough to check if something went wrong. What 
happened in 2002, looking at the results, obviously something went wrong, 
otherwise we would not have lost [X] bn. …We knew the risk position that 
we had, we presented the risk position to senior management, to the Board 
of Directors, everybody was aware of it. So it is not that we did not know. 
We just did not do anything about it or not fast enough.  
 
Thus the risk officers realised they had to give more timely and firmer signals to the 
decision makers– they needed early warning indicators. The Director of Credit Risk 
Controlling confirmed this, and recalled a previous control debacle from the lending 
area, which also pointed to the need for leading risk indicators: 
 
We had a real estate crisis in the 90s and we lost about [X] billion. 
Management had a too offensive strategy for too long. They wanted to grow 
and took too much risk, mostly in mortgages.  
 
Responding to the perceived need for early warning systems, the credit risk silo 
controllers devised a warning indicator, which was expected to give more timely 
signals of emerging problems. As the Director of Credit Risk Controlling explained, 
it was a crude metric, a trend indicator rather than a risk measure per se:  
 
Here is something very interesting and important to me. The migration 
matrix. This is part of risk calculation. … We take the ratio between up- and 
down-gradings [both measured as percentages of the loan portfolio] and if it 
is lower than 1 – it says that there are more down-gradings than up-
gradings. It means if you are below 50 per cent you tend to have more risk 
in the portfolio. It doesn‘t say anything about the amount [of risk]. 
However, the trend is interesting. The big picture behind it can be recession 
or recovery, you are not sure, but it is an indicator for me. … My function is 
to show the problems. 
 
This guarded attitude to risk quantification among market and credit risk officers is 
all the more striking when the literature suggests that these risk areas provide risk 
managers with the most confidence in their calculations. While most financial risk 
managers are expected to be ‗calculative idealists‘ (Power, 2003b), Gotebank‘s 
financial risk controllers appeared to be ‗calculative pragmatists‘, in that they 
regarded numbers as attention-directing devices with no intrinsic claims to represent 
reality. An understanding emerged that in a large organisation, where there is a 
hierarchy of limits, lower-level risk limits can be fluid, negotiable, and adjustable for 
the needs of the business.  
 
 20 
Senior risk staff‘s attitudes to operational risk management also displayed calculative 
pragmatism and much scepticism about quantitative risk control. On the face of it, 
risk officers in the operational risk controlling area were developing key risk 
indicators that would render operational processes to measurement and control. 
However, the Director of Operational Risk Controlling remained cautious about the 
use of risk measurements:  
 
I don‘t know if I should put all my effort into risk measurement to quantify 
[given that] when it really happens my figure would be for sure completely 
wrong. So why should I put all my resources into something that is 
senseless? I am not a fan of the quantitative approach in OpRisk. If you look 
at the losses, most of them are based on human behaviour – now how do 
you measure it? 
 
Given the doubts about the plausibility of the quantification of operational risk, the 
controller‘s informed, experience-based judgement was the key to operational risk 
control. The operational risk silo aimed at pushing responsibility for operational risk 
down to business unit and line management level. Based on his extensive operational 
experience and relations within the bank, the operational risk director cultivated an 
advisory and collaborative, rather than policing role over the business unit risk 
managers, which encouraged them to report operational losses (over a certain 
threshold, as and when they occurred) into a loss database. This was then used for 
preparing ‗risk reviews‘, thereby turning risk control into a learning exercise. The 
CRO confirmed:  
 
CRO: I have doubts whether you actually can define things such as key risk indicators 
on operational risk. Maybe the thing kind of evades as soon as you start 
measuring it. Which is not bad – then you have solved at least your perceived 
problem. Instead of this, however, I agree with [the Director of Operational 
Risk] that it is highly judgemental. It is a question of how you can bring in that 
judgement. What you also have to see whenever we talk about operational 
risk… in [Operational Risk Controlling] there are four or five people, but this 
is just the tip of the iceberg, because operational risk is a line management 
function. They have to set up their procedures and processes in an appropriate 
way so that these things do not happen. … Then the question becomes, if you 
want to do something on operational risk on a firm-wide basis, which I think 
we agreed, what is the most meaningful thing you do with a couple of people? I 
think it has to do with risk reporting and risk reviews. Let me give you an 
example on risk reviews. It is to evaluate accidents. So we say we had a case X, 
it costs us 5 million, now what can we do to prevent it from happening in the 
future?  
AM: Is that learning from mistakes? 
CRO: Yes, exactly.  
 
It appears that risk silo management at Gotebank was characterised by the exercise of 
a great deal of calculative pragmatism. While risk controllers respected the inherent 
need for risk taking in the banking business they also recognised the additional need 
for learning about the dynamics of risk.  
 
Apart from the activities of risk silo controllers and senior risk officers, a third group 
deserves attention in the risk function: the economic risk capital team. The ERC team 
was the originator and the guardian of Gotebank‘s economic capital methodology. 
Through the ERC methodology they brought integration to the quantifiable set of 
 21 
Gotebank‘s risk management framework. ERC was calculated for each risk silo and 
trends were reported monthly to the board.  
 
Looking back at the worsening ERC trend in Division X‘s risk portfolio prior to the 
crisis, Gotebank‘s management realised that ERC had the potential to be an indicator 
of the group‘s risk profile. The Chief Risk officer recalled: 
 
What we changed this year are two things. First, we said, risk has to be an explicit 
topic in the strategic business plan. … What we also said was, the board of 
directors does not only have to approve the strategic business plan, but it also has 
to approve the risk appetite, in the form of an overall ERC limit for the Group. 
 
This required the application of ERC as a common denominator of risk, to aggregate 
risk across risk silos and divisions. Similar calculations were introduced to conclude 
the planning process, to highlight the projected risk profile based on divisional (and 
group) planning forecasts. This was a step towards determining the ‗risk appetite‘ of 
the group, and to judge if the projected overall risk profile in the business plan was 
adequate. With ERC becoming a tool to set the risk appetite of the group, integrated 
risk management was, apparently, becoming recognisable. 
 
However, ERC was a rather controversial metric: it was regarded at best as a trend 
indicator, not an accurate reflection of the underlying risk profile.  Not even in the 
case of Division X‘s recapitalisation were ERC calculations the basis of decision 
making. These calculations took place within the finance function, which had its own 
assessment of how much capital Gotebank‘s subsidiaries needed to hold in order to 
satisfy stakeholder and business requirements.
7
 Similarly, ERC calculations failed to 
effectively feed into the yearly exercise of intra-group capital attribution and 
performance measurement. Accordingly, the head of the ERC team struggled to find a 
point of linkage with the strategy and control departments: 
 
We could calculate Economic Profit, but if we did, nobody would want to have it 
in the Strategic Business Plan that goes to the board. … Controlling [the finance 
function] for example does not support it. 
 
A major quantification challenge arose from the fact that there were 
interdependencies between the business units– they relied on each other‘s capital 
strength. For example, the private banking unit traditionally carried less capital as it 
relied on the capital-strength of the retail operation. Adjusting for these effects by 
quantifying the shared capital-benefits in an economic manner was a major challenge 
for the ERC team. The economic capital calculations, although deemed indicative of 
risk exposure trends, were judged as insufficient to reflect the absolute risk profile 
and capital need of individual business units. The resulting quantitative scepticism 
around the ERC tool made the CRO reluctant to deploy it in a computational role. 
Capital allocation and performance measurement remained in the court of the finance 
function. The long-existing, conventional accounting practices deployed in the intra-
                                                          
7
 As accounting controllers saw ERC not as a complementary, but as a competing control tool, they 
resisted it. From their point of view there was already an established accounting control available for the 
Division‘s capital adequacy. Division X‘s post-crisis recapitalisation was led by accounting controls. 
Also, the subsequent reconsideration of Division X‘s country portfolio and the wave of divestitures of the 
weakly capitalised businesses were driven by accounting-based solvency considerations.  
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group planning and performance discussions were not challenged by the notions of 
ERM – risk-based management had no ground to grow on. 
 
4.3.  The uses of risk management at Gotebank  
 
The monthly executive risk report was a thick document. Inside the report there were 
dozens of charts graphically representing risk exposure lists, trends as well as risk 
limit breaches from all over the bank (no subsidiaries or functions were exempt from 
data provision), arranged neatly under the headings of market risk, credit risk and 
operational risk. Most risk controllers seriously doubted whether all this information 
got read. As one of them put it, ‗We would like it if the receivers of our analysis came 
back to us with questions. But they don‘t.‘ After asking executives from the strategy 
department and the finance division, it became apparent that the problem was that the 
key strategic risk concerns of top management were not quantifiable. The Director of 
Strategy and Projects explained: 
 
The trouble about the interface between risk and strategy is that at the very 
high level, there is a very simple list of risks to look at from a strategy 
perspective. … Then somebody goes there to do all these detailed models, 
the ERC thing and all that, and you have to think where you add value. If it 
is the basis for capital allocations, that‘s fine but…in the end, generally 
speaking, risk at a very high level is very simple and straightforward. 
 
Thus it appeared that the production of risk reports did satisfy a regulatory 
expectation- the need to produce board-level risk information. Risk reporting was 
used as part of top management‘s dashboard of management controls. Accordingly, 
top management‘s interest in risk silo control appeared to be heightened only at 
significant control breaches:
8
 they used risk silo control as a diagnostic control 
system. Generally board discussions deviated from the content of the risk report 
towards more ‗strategic‘ issues. Strategic discussions were outside the formal 
reporting coverage of risk silo people, and those issues got very little (if any) 
representation in the monthly risk report. Having recognised this, the CRO‘s 
aspiration for the future was to solve the problem of providing ‗meaningful high-level 
risk information‘ to the board. 
 
By including non-quantifiable risks into the remit of the risk control, the intention 
was to move beyond risk silo management towards holistic risk management. 
Pondering the monthly board risk report, the CRO reflected:  
 
CRO: If you look at the Key Exposure Report, it tries to cover all significant risks 
in a more or less comprehensive fashion.  
                                                          
8
 Mikes (2008) concludes that GOTEBANK‘s top management used risk controls and accounting 
controls with varying degree of intensity motivated by the relevance and the perceived institutional 
appropriateness of these controls. As external requirements changed in the course of the crisis that hit the 
insurance division (Division X), the definition of institutional appropriateness shifted as well. While risk 
management had a legitimate role in crisis management, in the subsequent consolidation of the group, and the 
insurance division in particular, the accounting controllers played a more influential (interactive control) part. 
In the insurance sector investors and regulators followed accounting indicators to gauge the performance of 
Division X. The apparent lack of institutional appropriateness of the risk controls  in the insurance world (at 
the time) prevented the otherwise informationally relevant risk control system from prevailing as an 
interactive control system. 
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AM: You mean all significant risks that are quantifiable? 
CRO: Absolutely – that‘s the big caveat. The big risks today are: are we running 
the right strategy or not? What do we do with private banking going 
forward? Should we grow retail banking [domestically] or rather abroad? 
Now, how do you integrate these into the monthly risk report? 
 
It is remarkable that Gotebank‘s senior risk officers claimed access to the discussion 
of corporate-level strategies. When I suggested that by doing so, the risk people might 
be encroaching upon the territories of the strategy and finance functions, the CRO  
briskly replied: ‗Not if you have a chief risk officer. Because that‘s what you pay him 
for.‘ 
 
At that time the strategy and planning function was sceptical about the possible 
contribution risk people could make to strategy analysis. A few months later it 
emerged that the risk function sought to render strategic uncertainties to scenario 
analysis in order to deal with problems that were on the border between strategic 
planning and the risk silos, between non-quantifiable and quantifiable risks. The 
Group senior risk officers (the CRO of Gotebank, the CRO of the investment bank, 
and the Group-CRO) treated this as part of their personal agenda: 
 
CRO: We [the three CROs of Gotebank Group] have discussions about what the 
most dangerous things that could happen are. We put together a report to the 
board about these and what we do against them. … It could be the quality of 
the [domestic] lending portfolio, given its sheer size. It could be the impact 
of an interest rate increase on the asset portfolio of [Division X]. It could be 
further erosion, further defaults in the energy sector in the US.  
AM: So this is really a bird‘s eye view, looking at the business from the top. 
CRO: Right. It is a 30,000 feet view of the world.‘ 
 
Senior risk officers thus looked beyond the risk silos, scanning the organisational 
landscape from above, in order to find problem areas to alert the executive and 
supervisory boards.  
These discussions proved to be of much more relevance to top management. Given 
that the bank was recovering from a series of strategic mistakes and financial losses, 
top management was much more inclined to listen to a new voice in strategic control– 
that of the senior risk officers‘.9 This was reflected in top management‘s frequent and 
regular interest in what senior risk officers had to say, and it was acknowledged by 
those present at executive board meetings. As the Chief Credit Officer commented at 
the end of the year:  
 
 [The CRO‘s] organisation is relatively new. This year I feel his influence 
has increased. I am part of these [executive board-level] meetings. In my 
opinion, his influence in strategic discussion and decision [making] has 
increased. He contributes on a regular basis and he has his own opinion, ja. 
 
He also noted that senior risk officers themselves required strategic information from 
the business line, in regular face-to-face meetings: 
 
AM: Would [the CRO] contribute with information he gets formally from his 
own people [the risk department]? 
                                                          
9
 This observation supports Simons (1991) thesis that at the time of financial crisis, top management 
are inclined to use multiple control systems interactively. 
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CCO: Ha! (Laughs) He has different sources. That‘s good. I mean, even sources 
like discussions with people between four eyes, when he just talks to 
important people in the organisation, informally. As I said he has different 
sources.  
 
This holistic risk management approach set the example for senior risk officers within 
the business units too. For example, the post-crisis CRO of Division X instigated 
‗special risk reviews‘ to be presented to risk management committees by line 
management staff on topics as diverse as foreign exchange risk and specific strategic 
issues. According to the meeting schedules, quantitative risk analyses received 15 -30 
minutes of attention, while special risk topics were discussed for 45 -90 minutes. The 
CRO of Division X commented: 
 
My role is not to be a nice guy. If I schedule a topic for this management 
committee, nobody says no. If somebody says no, I am going to be suspicious 
very quickly. The people [invited to hold presentations on specific issues] know 
that there is no value in undermining it because they are going to talk in front of 
the chief executive officer, not just to me. (…) If risk management has a strong 
opinion on certain risk profiles, it is more difficult for top management not to 
consider it.    
 
It appears that in the same way as in Gotebank, the risk framework, originally risk 
silo management, was augmented by holistic risk management within Division X too. 
Accordingly, the business unit CRO perceived an increase in top management‘s 
interest in the risk committee meetings for which he set the agenda: holistic risk 
management was emerging as an interactive control system.  
 
 
4.4. Summary: The CRO as „éminence grise‟ 
 
Gotebank displayed a wide exemplar of best practices in risk management. Risk silo 
management, integrated risk management and holistic risk management emerged as 
clearly visible in the risk management mix, furthered by risk silo controllers, risk 
capital controllers and senior risk officers, respectively. It appeared that risk-based 
management did not take root at Gotebank during the field study period. 
 
The characteristic feature of risk management in Gotebank was the strong scepticism 
that senior risk officers applied to risk quantification. Risk silo control was turned 
into a learning exercise, as risk measures were treated as trend indicators rather than 
expressions of the underlying economic reality. This quantitative scepticism became a 
hindrance to the performance measurement ambitions of the economic risk capital 
team. Deploying risk calculations in performance measurement requires ‗trust in 
numbers‘ (Porter 1995). As the ERC methodology struggled to gain sufficient 
credibility for becoming a basis for performance measurement, the archetype of risk-
based management, for the time being, was doomed at Gotebank.  
 
Instead, senior risk officers used their agenda setting power to put strategic, business 
concerns on the agenda of the board, and sought to actively influence the discussion 
of non-quantifiable risks. holistic risk management emerged as an alternative way to 
link risk management and strategic decision making, even though that took place 
outside the formal planning and control cycle.  
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It appeared that at the time of the case study, the risk function lacked formal, in-house 
strategic control capabilities. Strategic information had to be channelled to the risk 
committee meetings directly from line management. Senior risk officers exercised 
their influence and accumulated power- formally through agenda-setting, and 
informally via knowing influential others. This conjures up a medieval metaphor for 
the chief risk officer: that of the „éminence grise‟10, acting behind the scenes, a 
powerful advisor left to his own resources. 
 
                                                          
10
 This phrase originally referred to Francois Leclerc du Tremblay, the right-hand man and 
confidante of Cardinal Richelieu (also known as the Red Eminence). Aldous Huxley wrote an 
English biography of Lecrec entitled Grey Eminence (new edition published by Vintage, 
2005). 
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5. Enterprise risk management in action: the case of Fraser Bank
11
 
 
5.1. Introduction, contingency factors and institutional pressures 
 
At first sight Fraser Bank‘s risk management practices resembled those at Gotebank. 
Risk was measured, managed and reported by risk silos, giving the impression of 
enterprise-wide coverage. There was a separate economic capital team within the risk 
function. A number of senior risk officers orchestrated a crowded committee 
structure, quarterly and monthly risk committee meetings, with increasingly 
formalised reporting practices.  
 
Further, Fraser Bank was comparable in size (market capitalisation) and in its variety 
of activities to Gotebank Group. Looking at it from headquarters level, Fraser 
appeared to be a decentralised banking organisation with fairly autonomous business 
units, such as investment banking, asset management, retail, corporate and private 
banking. 
 
Strikingly different in Fraser, however, was a strong value-based management (VBM) 
ethos. Instigated in 2000, the VBM implementation was well under way by the start of 
my case study. Although the risk management department had been in place for some 
ten years by then, the VBM initiative led to a complete overhaul of the central risk 
function. Its mission was restated in terms of ‗supporting the [Fraser] Group Strategy‘ 
by ‗providing better support to [business unit] risk management‘ in anticipation of ‗a 
direct effect on economic value creation.‘12  
 
The reorganisation of the risk function was part of an ongoing group-wide efficiency 
review, and the structural overhaul of many other central functions from marketing to 
IT. These structural changes were the reflections of a fundamental change in 
management and control that had been initiated at the top of the organization. Fraser 
Bank was switching to value-based management (VBM) principles. The Chief 
Executive Officer was a passionate advocate of the shareholder value imperative:  
 
‗Positioning [Frasers] among the leading value-creating companies world-wide 
is my highest priority. (…) Managing for value is not a one-off change 
initiative. It is an enduring way of running the enterprise.‘13  
 
A preference for a steady growth strategy was emphasized when the executive board 
set the group goal of ‗doubling value every four years.‘ 
 
5.2. The roles of risk management at Fraser Bank 
 
Fraser operated with risk silos similar to those found at Gotebank: market risk, credit 
risk and operational risk (also referred to as ‗non-financial and compliance risk‘). The 
risk methodologies had a decade-long history: they had been evolving since 1993. 
The central risk function was also the custodian of a loss data warehouse that 
                                                          
11
 For reasons of confidentiality, the identity of the bank has been disguised. 
12
 All quotes from a presentation by the Group Risk Director titled ‗Creating an expert team‘ 
13
 This quote is from an internal training document. 
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supported the continuous development of quantified risk measurement approaches 
and back-testing.  
 
The Risk Policy Director, responsible for the risk methodologies applied in the risk 
silos, gave the first hint of what appeared to be the bank‘s commitment to manage 
risk by computation (Burchell et al., 1980), when he opened our conversation with the 
line: ‗If you want to manage risk, you have to quantify it.‘ 
 
Fraser Bank‘s senior risk and strategy officers revealed sufficient ‗quantitative 
enthusiasm‘ to set out to ‗induce correct economic behaviour in the light of risk 
measures‘ (Power, 2003b: 14). The progress of the risk function was assessed by 
judging how advanced the quantification methodologies were, and by the bank‘s 
ability to make decisions based on them. The Risk Policy Director, whose long tenure 
at the bank made him qualify as ‗the institutional memory‘ (as he liked to call 
himself), recalled: 
 
Initially there was a market risk management team and a credit risk management 
team. But even the market risk management team was not very professional, we did 
not have a proper measurement system. We did have crude measurement systems. 
… Market risk was managed by the treasurer. The head of credit– well, his job was 
regarded as taking big lending decisions. Operational risk at that stage wasn‘t really 
talked about. … [Risk management] has been evolving since 1993. First, we made 
the management of market risk more professional, so it is much more structured 
and quantified. Then we made credit risk more quantified. The job of the Chief 
Credit Officer became quite different. Even though he was still quite involved in 
big decisions, his job was to manage the portfolio rather than individual credits. 
 
While Gotebank was a relatively late adopter of quantitative risk modelling, Fraser 
was the first European bank to implement value-at-risk in the market risk area, 
together with the quantitative credit rating of the entire lending book. This quantified 
view of the financial risks enabled the bank to manage both the trading book and the 
lending book ‗by the numbers‘, applying portfolio management principles.  
 
As the reorganisation of the risk function took place against the backdrop of the 
group-wide VBM implementation, risk management was (re)developed as a pillar of 
the new control framework. Using the terminology proposed in Section 3, Fraser was 
aiming for the implementation of the risk-based management framework, in which 
risk officers were tasked with the ‗granular attribution of Economic Capital‘ to 
business units. What this meant in practice was a formal integration of business 
planning, performance measurement and economic capital allocation, the latter under 
the auspices of the risk management function, as explained by a manager from the 
strategy and planning function as follows:  
 
The businesses put forward their proposals having linked in with [the central risk 
management department] and [the] Economic Capital [team]. They generate 
appropriate figures upon which we make the choices about where to bet the bank. 
The calculations are done by the businesses initially. They work it through with 
[the] Risk [department]. … There is a methodology provided by [the] Risk 
[function] that the businesses must use in order to calculate Economic Capital.  
 
The strategy and planning function then negotiated the alternative plans through with 
the business units, in an attempt to optimise risk-adjusted profitability across the 
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group, until an agreement was reached with each of them. The agreed plans were 
presented to the executive board, where the focus of discussions was Economic 
Profit.  
 
Crucial to the workings of risk-based management at Fraser was the existence of the 
economic capital framework. Towards the end of this study the Head of Economic 
Capital team saw his role as follows: 
 
Economic profit inherently needs economic capital because you have to adjust 
your profit by the risk that you have taken in order to reach that profit. So that‘s 
how we link to the rest of the Group and Strategy and Planning in terms of 
providing cost of risk [the product of economic capital times the cost of equity, for 
each business unit]. That‘s how we feed into the Finance and Strategy areas. 
 
Thus a separate economic capital team was created, initially within the planning 
function. The risk capital specialists were later transferred to the risk department. 
According to the previously quoted manager, the economic capital framework helped 
determine the ‗risk appetite‘ of the group and contributed to risk limit setting within 
the organisation: 
 
We obviously get involved with risk appetite. Making sure that now we have one 
unit of measurement across the bank of unexpected loss, which is Economic 
Capital and then we can use that to allocate our risk appetite. 
 
What bestowed the economic capital framework with the image of being ‗integrated‘ 
was its status as a common denominator and language of risk. Unlike in Gotebank, in 
this setting economic capital was believed to express and make comparable the risk 
taken by the business units; also, the risk taken by the group over time.  
 
Applying risk measurements in decision making by computation assumes that the 
cause-effect and goal ambiguities around the calculative practice had been minimised 
(Thompson and Tuden, 1959). Fraser‘s risk controllers operated in a managerial 
environment that demanded both goal consensus and the resolution of cause-effect 
ambiguities around risk control techniques. The resulting calculative culture was 
strikingly different from the quantitative scepticism displayed among several risk 
officers at Gotebank. 
 
As Power (2003b: 14) suggested, some risk managers believe that risk calculations 
are capable of reflecting underlying economic realities and ‗worry constantly about 
the ‗robust‘ and ‗hard‘ nature of … risk analysis.‘ Indeed, Fraser‘s quantitative 
enthusiasts voiced much commitment to maintaining the ‗leading edge‘ reputation of 
their risk methodologies, including that of the economic capital framework. In the 
bank‘s committee structure there was a separate body devoted to discussing and 
updating the risk measurement methodologies in use. Debates on methodology were 
sparked by concerns that this leading technical position might be eroded. A manager 
from the strategy and planning department recalled:  
 
Back in the 90s, I think Fraser had a really good methodology. The perception we 
had was: some American banks were further down the road than we were, but we 
were ahead of the UK banks. I think we have got to the point where there is this 
big upheaval: there is a big question mark about whether our risk methodology is 
up to scratch. With Basel II going on, the feeling is that everyone is catching up, I 
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assume it is the impetus to the current debates. … We can‘t afford having any of 
the analysts or anyone else saying we have a bad methodology. 
 
During the course of the study I was witness to the complete overhaul of the 
economic capital methodology. It involved the reallocation of capital charges across 
the business units, thereby inherently affecting their performance in terms of 
economic profit. It was a process involving high political sensitivity. The task 
defeated an entire economic capital team before a second group of risk capital 
officers finally managed to negotiate it through. The head of this new economic 
capital team, who orchestrated the process recalled: 
 
Everyone said, let‘s get [internal capital allocations] more accurate. But they 
wanted to minimise their portion of the more accurate pie. So there was a 
tension… By setting the objective and clarifying the rules there was less room for 
people to move. That‘s not to say you don‘t get people arguing and so on, but the 
rules keep people straight. And you keep it all consistent. By sitting around a 
table, instead of one-to-one negotiations, you end up with group negotiations. The 
best minds in business bank and [the investment banking arm of the group] came 
up with the methodology, so they cannot argue on technology [emphasis added by 
the researcher]. Each business unit was represented by risk managers and lenders, 
to make sure we took in both the technical perspective and the market perspective. 
 
The creators of the new methodology derived much credibility from the procedural 
fairness and political appropriateness that characterized the review. Their success was 
also due to the perceived technical competence that was deployed in the process. By 
successfully repairing the internal credibility of the ERC framework, risk capital 
officers ensured that both integrated risk management and risk-based management 
stood on a solid foundation. 
 
The redefinition of capital allocations via the economic capital tool also showed risk 
management in the role of ‗ammunition machine‘ (Burchell et al., 1980). Internal 
actors ‗could not argue on technology‘: they argued with it.  The representatives of a 
powerful business unit and the central risk department applied the tool to draw others 
into agreeing on a new reality of risk profiles and capital allocation across the group. 
Risk controllers adopted the ‗conference technique‘ (Roberts, 1990), which is 
suggestive of the political realities of risk management; rather than imposing the ‗risk 
view‘ from the centre, risk controllers orchestrated a collective process, through 
which relative risk profiles were defined and commitments to capital charges were 
made. Risk-based management is as much a political process as other forms of 
budgeting.  
 
But to play the role of ‗ammunition‘, the risk technology (ERC) had to command the 
power of representation. Its success in achieving a representative status in Fraser 
Bank and its failure to do so in Gotebank were in part the results of user attitudes. 
ERC was an ‗unarguable technology‘ in Fraser Bank, while at Gotebank was merely 
seen as ‗detailed models‘ missing important decision aspects that were deemed as 
non-quantifiable.  
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5.3. The uses of risk management at Fraser Bank 
 
According to the Head of Economic Capital, top management appeared to call on risk 
control as a signifier of potential problems, using it as a diagnostic control, as part of 
the performance management dashboard: 
 
This is the report that we send to [the board] – a monthly brief summary. [Leafing 
through the risk report:] It is practically a dashboard saying this is how this or 
that business unit is using up its economic capital. 
 
The aggregation of the risk content of different business plans and business units 
created new visibilities to performance, and had the potential of bringing previously 
latent risks into the open. Accordingly, the economic capital framework was also used 
by top management to track and signal excessive risk-taking that warranted additional 
capital need. As the Director of Risk Policy expressed, corrective action took place 
with reference to a tolerance interval:   
 
…what happens when the bottom-up assessment [of risk capital need] is higher 
than the book value [of available capital]? … Well, we have a tolerance range 
which says you can‘t measure these things down to the last penny anyway. So if it 
comes within 120 per cent then we are happy, if it comes over 120 percent then 
we need additional capital. 
 
In general, risk specialists at Fraser concentrated on devising quantitative control 
tools over the measurable risk types, and had little involvement in the control of non-
quantifiable risks. 
 
Nevertheless, there were a few senior risk officers at Frasers who had expected to 
have greater visibility and voice in strategic decision making. The Director of Risk 
Reporting, for example, envisioned a role for his function that was to be broader than 
financial risk measurement and reporting. With a hint of irony he likened the role of 
the senior risk manager to that of the ‗medieval licensed jester, allowed to be more 
sceptical about what is going on‘, constantly challenging existing assumptions and 
views, and scrutinising strategic decisions before they are made. Such a ‗licence‘ 
could have given rise to holistic risk management.  
 
However, unlike Gotebank‘s CROs, Frasers‘ senior risk officers lacked the three 
conditions that secured their Gotebank peers the ears of the board in strategic risk 
discussions: information, agenda setting power and mandate. 
 
During the years, risk silo management was gradually pushed down into the business 
units, so that it could inform risk-taking in the line. This decentralised approach left 
the risk people at the centre with responsibility for the methodologies used at business 
unit level, but gradually distanced them from the business. Business unit risk 
managers developed ‗double loyalties‘, sometimes shielding their division from 
outside risk enquiries, which made it even more difficult for headquarters risk 
managers to see into their affairs. 
 
Secondly, it appeared that at Fraser the centre of power concentrated on staff who 
furthered the risk-based management framework. The very idea of value based 
management and the value-focused, in extremis single-minded culture it imposed 
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proved to be a hindrance to the Director of Risk Reporting, who harboured ambitions 
to comment on non-quantifiable risk issues: 
 
[The] risk [function] by definition, like audit, sits outside the culture of an 
organisation as a whole, it has to. And the more important it becomes to a 
business that everybody sings in tune, the less space is given for any kind of 
business voice. And it becomes very difficult for a risk manager, at any level, 
either talking to a trader or talking to the chairman of the bank, to challenge. The 
skill is challenging without causing offence and if the trading manager and the 
chairman are wise, they listen. But it is also possible to get carried away by 
trying to drive the corporate culture and by a general desire from everyone to get 
there, that any kind of challenge is not welcome, even if it comes from the risk 
function … whose role is to challenge.14 
 
The strategy and planning function set the agenda for the executive committee, and 
they did not invite the challenge that the senior risk officers hoped to introduce into 
the agenda. Accordingly, the Director of Risk Reporting noted that risk reporting did 
not channel into important strategic decisions; for example there was no contribution 
from the risk function to the due diligence of a recently acquired mortgage lending 
company. Senior risk officers did not possess the agenda-setting power that their 
counterparts at Gotebank did. 
 
Thirdly, the mandate of risk management gave legitimacy to the risk function to 
operate in matters of quantifiable risk issues; however, it denied them access to 
strategic discussions. A senior risk officer defined the problem as follows: 
 
These non-financial risk issues are not very technical, more subjective. The issue 
is to identify some quantitative measures that we can assess on a regular basis. 
 
Ironically, it was the commitment of risk staff to risk quantification that 
prevented them from developing a perspective on strategic and other business 
risk issues– they did not have the tools to frame these matters.  
 
5.4. Summary: The paradox of resolving the challenges of risk computation 
 
The evidence suggests that Fraser Bank‘s preference for reconciling risk and return 
objectives was via negotiation in a characteristic risk-based management framework. 
Orchestrated by the strategy function, the planning process called on the economic 
capital team to provide the capital charges into the calculations of economic profit. 
Responding to a calculative culture favouring management by numbers, the risk 
function also provided the necessary analytics to make quantifiable risks subject to 
limit setting and control. 
 
Maintaining credible economic capital calculations for the purpose of risk-return 
optimisation required a great deal of technical competence and political aptness on 
the part of risk capital controllers. By successfully resolving the ambiguities around 
risk calculations, their contribution to the workings of the group‘s VBM framework 
became endemic. Although particular risk silo controls were used diagnostically (as 
part of top management‘s dashboard), senior risk officers lacked the information, 
                                                          
14
 Director of Risk Reporting; Fraser Bank 
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power and mandate to get implicated in discussions about more strategic, non-
quantifiable risk issues. The remit of the risk control system was confined to the 
quantifiable risk universe. 
 
Fraser Bank‘s case is suggestive of an inherent conflict in the ERM assembly.  
Realising the ideal of risk-based management required Fraser‘s risk managers to 
focus on quantifiable risks. Their commitment to a calculative culture of managing 
risk by the numbers resulted in a boundary around their remit that prevented them 
from gaining access to the framing of non-quantifiable risk issues. The ideal of 
holistic risk management was frustrated, hence the paradox of resolving the 
challenges of risk computation; by doing so, the risk function‘s limit became confined 
and inflexible. The function might have become a cog in the wheel of value creation, 
but it was not part of the strategic engine.  
 
 
6. Discussion   
 
Both Gotebank and Fraser have embarked on implementing risk management 
practices with an aspiration to apply them consistently and coherently across their 
organisations. Although these projects furthered the notion of ERM, it appeared that 
the ERM mix took very different shapes in the two banks. This section compares and 
contrasts the observed patterns of the forms and uses of ERM practices.  
 
6.1. Three types of risk officers, four types of ERM, two patterns of strategic 
significance  
 
Three types of risk practitioners have emerged at both organizations. The 
differentiation of the risk function mirrored the varying aspirations of risk officers. It 
also reflected four risk management ideal types that pose different challenges to the 
risk management staff in banks. Accordingly, the functional differentiation of risk 
people was indicated by the different technologies they applied and the different roles 
they fulfilled.  
 
The first group (risk silo specialists) consisted of those who were engaged in risk silo 
management, the measurement and assessment of different risk types. Grappling with 
the challenges of data collection and risk quantification, they produced voluminous 
reports on adherence to risk limits. Their diagnoses tended to lead to different 
outcomes. In Gotebank‘s case ‗red signals‘ were treated as a learning opportunity 
often prompting revisions of limits (rather than intervention). In Frasers, limit 
breaches were acted upon by eventual risk profile correction. However, these reports 
did not sustain top management‘s frequent and regular attention; their role was, in 
these contexts, diagnostic (Simons, 1991). This is because the risks that habitually 
concerned the board tended to be of a more elusive, strategic or regulatory nature, and 
hence, stayed outside the reach of risk silo specialists.  
 
The production of the quantitative risk estimates allowed risk managers to address the 
problem of risk aggregation. Another group of risk managers emerged (risk capital 
specialists), who were concerned with integrated risk management. Based on a 
common denominator for risk (economic capital), risk aggregation allowed risk 
capital specialists to assess the risk profile of the institution, set limits, and do the 
same for individual business units. This opened up the route for the integration of 
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return and risk concerns in a single framework, risk-based management. Furthering 
the theme of risk-based performance measurement, this requires aspiring institutions 
to arrive at risk-based (economic) capital allocations to their responsibility centres.  
 
In practice economic capital allocation incorporated much organizational politics, and 
was successfully completed by the risk capital specialists of Fraser Bank only. Here a 
strong value based management ethos paved the way for risk capital specialists to 
reconcile internal definitions of capital with headquarters‘ expectations. It was 
through the provision of economic capital charges that ERM became an integral part 
of the strategic planning and performance measurement process. However, risk 
capital specialists had to be prepared to live in an uneasy symbiosis with the planning 
department who supported them in their efforts to define definitions of capital 
allocations, but on the other hand denied them top-level visibility.  
 
Securing access to the board has encouraged senior risk officers to exercise informal 
influence on some strategic concerns. However, their influence on major strategic 
decisions had been limited. Their favoured role was that of the devil‘s advocate- 
challenging and questioning existing beliefs in order to prepare the organization to 
fend off emerging adversities. This required them to put non-quantifiable risk issues 
on the agenda of top management (e.g. non-recurring operational risks, reputational, 
legal and strategic risks). Only at Gotebank had senior risk officers the information, 
agenda setting power and mandate to do so. It was through the provision of 
information about non-quantifiable risks that senior risk officers furthered the ideal of 
holistic risk management, and invited top management to use their offering as an 
interactive control system. The sources of information they called upon were in the 
business lines; information was collected in an ad hoc fashion and presented by 
selected line managers. Holistic risk management was a rather flexibly applied 
control process. 
 
The case studies point towards two diverging patterns of organizational significance 
on the part of the risk management functions observed. In one case (demonstrated by 
Frasers) risk management becomes integral to the formal planning and performance 
measurement process, while remains neutral in the discussions of key strategic 
decisions that emerge outside the planning cycle. In the second case (demonstrated by 
Gotebank), risk management is incidental as far as the formal planning and control 
cycle is concerned, however senior risk officers acquire agenda-setting power and 
information to participate in top management-level decision making and influence the 
discussion of key strategic uncertainties. Thus the organizational significance of risk 
management appears to hinge upon the organizational significance of the risk 
manager. It is a characteristic of the current development of ERM that there are 
multiple possibilities for its practice in organizations.  
 
6.2. ERM, corporate governance imperatives and calculative cultures 
 
It seemed that the organizationally significant risk officers responded to different 
corporate governance pressures and fostered different calculative cultures. Power 
(2003a) postulated that two powerful institutional notions drive the rise of ERM: the 
shareholder value imperative and the risk-based control imperative. These represent 
different approaches to corporate governance. The first emphasises the role of ERM 
practices in the measurement of shareholder value, and in the advancement of 
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managerial practices that are designed explicitly to promote value creation via 
performance measurement. I call this notion of risk management ERM by numbers. 
The notion of risk-based internal control emphasises the role of those ERM practices 
that are designed around the wider strategic objectives of the firm, and further the 
achievement of these through internal (formal and informal) controls, designed over 
processes that constitute risks to these objectives, giving rise to what one might call 
holistic ERM. 
 
Fraser Bank was driven by a strong shareholder value imperative.  Here risk 
managers become involved in the strategic planning and performance measurement 
process, and the salient element in the risk management mix was risk-based 
management. ERM‘s input into the planning process was the quantitative assessment 
of the risk profile of alternative business units and strategies that allowed the 
organization to optimize the competing risk and return objectives. Here risk 
controllers placed the emphasis on the robustness and accuracy of the risk models 
(quantitative enthusiasm). They believed that risk calculations are capable of 
reflecting the underlying economic reality, and by resolving cause-effect ambiguities, 
risk modelling can aid decision making by computation. However, this resulted in 
ERM by numbers becoming confined to financial and quantifiable risks, and senior 
risk officers did not get implicated in the discussion of non-quantifiable strategic 
risks.  
 
Gotebank possessed an ERM function that appeared to correspond to the corporate 
governance concern of risk-based internal control. Here the remit of ERM included 
‗strategic‘ and ‗operational‘ risks that were not quantifiable, as the definition of risk 
was sufficiently broad to encompass threatening events (COSO, 2004). The salient 
element in the risk management mix was holistic risk management. Apart from the 
risk-based control imperative, this holistic ERM was associated with a pragmatic, 
non-dogmatic, experimental approach to risk measures (quantitative scepticism), and 
the agenda setting power and informal influence of senior risk officers. Senior risk 
officers considered risk numbers at best as trend indicators surrounded by high cause-
effect uncertainties- useful as a learning tool, less so as an ‗answering machine‘ 
(Burchell et al., 1980). Senior risk officers aspired for a role in high level strategic 
decision making and exercised influence on decisions that were outside the remit of 
financial risk management. 
 
The study suggests that calculative cultures are constituents, and also are constituted 
of, the particular forms and uses of the control systems observed. The cases also 
highlight that there is scope for managerial discretion in the design of ERM systems. 
Firstly, the role of senior risk officers was evident in the politics of risk management. 
At Fraser senor risk officers had to orchestrate the process of capital allocations with 
political sensitivity and tact. At Gotebank senior risk officers amassed both agenda 
setting and informal power in order to become influential in the discussions of strategic 
issues. Secondly, it was, to some extent, a matter of managerial choice whether the 
risk-based internal control or the shareholder value imperative shone through the ERM 
models described. Apparently, senior risk officers formulated personal convictions 
about the manageability of risks by quantitative models. Senior risk officers at Frasers, 
who had more confidence in the reliability of the risk models (quantitative enthusiasts), 
were able to make risk numbers count in the contested locales of capital allocation and 
performance measurement. However, Gotebank‘s senior risk officers who had doubts 
 35 
about the use of quantitative models in these contested locales (quantitative sceptics) 
chose to define their area of competence broadly, encompassing risks outside the 
quantifiable risk framework. Table 2 summarises the discussion. 
 
 
ERM by the numbers Holistic ERM 
The forms of ERM 
Salient element in  
the risk management 
mix 
 
Risk-based management Holistic risk management 
Span of risk control Quantifiable risks 
Quantifiable as well as non-
quantifiable risks  
 
Roles and uses of ERM 
 
The roles of ERM 
 
 
Computation tool,  
‗ammunition machine‘ 
‗Learning machine‘ 
Top management‟s 
use of risk controls   
Diagnostic use of risk silo 
management and integrated                   
risk management 
Diagnostic use of risk silo 
management 
and interactive use of  
holistic risk management 
Strategic significance 
of risk management 
 
Derived from the integration  
of risk management  
with planning and  
performance management 
Derived from influencing  
top-level decision making 
Managerial context 
Contingency factors 
 Size similar to Gotebank‘s 
 Risk function older  
than 10 years 
 Firm strategy: 
conservative,  
steady growth firm 
 
 Size similar to Fraser‘s 
 Risk function relatively 
new (2-3 years) 
 Firm strategy:  
entrepreneurial firm 
driven by strategic 
spurs and halts 
 
Corporate  
Governance 
Imperative 
Shareholder value imperative 
Risk-based internal control  
imperative 
Calculative culture 
Quantitative enthusiasm: 
 Risk numbers are  
deemed representative 
of the underlying  
economic reality 
 Emphasis on the  
‗robust‘ and ‗hard‘  
nature of modelling  
Quantitative scepticism: 
 Risk numbers are taken 
as trend indicators 
 Emphasis on learning 
about the underlying 
risk profile from the  
trend signals 
 
Case study example 
 
Fraser Gotebank 
 Table 2. Contrasting the two models of ERM 
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7. Conclusion and further directions for research 
 
In the financial services sector ERM is thought to embody a set of risk practices that 
encompass such wide-ranging techniques as vale-at-risk and economic capital 
models, as well as qualitative methods for non-financial risks. Practitioner predictions 
suggest that taken together, these risk management approaches increasingly constitute 
‗best practice‘ that more and more organisations aspire to implement (e.g. Lam 1999; 
Gilbert 2004). 
 
This paper argued that innovations in ERM techniques increasingly cluster around 
four themes: risk quantification, risk aggregation, risk-based performance 
measurement and the management of non-quantifiable risks. Each of these themes 
represents different ambitions and objectives that risk officers might pursue, giving 
rise to four risk management ideal types. These all have enterprise-wide ambitions, 
and can be viewed as the building blocks that constitute the risk management mix in a 
given organisation: risk silo management, integrated risk management, risk-based 
management and holistic risk management.  
 
Taking a field perspective, the paper proceeded to investigate the risk practices of two 
banks. Each bank appeared to possess a risk management mix that was specific to 
itself. However, the underlying currents that are associated with these patterns may be 
instructive in other cases too. 
 
The shareholder value imperative appears to drive a particular model of ERM 
characterised by a risk management mix in which risk-based management is a salient 
element (ERM by the numbers). This ERM model is contingent on a vision of uniting 
and controlling risk and return objectives in a common framework. This model 
presumes a great deal of ‗quantitative enthusiasm‘, as it requires the quantification of 
both the risk silos and the risk capital need of business entities. Hence risk 
management‘s remit is defined in terms of the quantifiable risks, and its concern with 
non-financial risks extends beyond the risk silos only as far as risk quantification is 
possible. The strategic significance of this risk management model is derived from its 
close integration with strategic planning and performance management, but as a 
control function, it is fundamentally diagnostic. 
 
On the other hand, the risk-based control imperative can be associated with a different 
model of risk management: one with a risk management mix in which holistic risk 
management is prominent (holistic ERM). Taking a great deal of quantitative 
scepticism‘, risk officers quantify risks, but exercise control in a flexible manner, 
allowing the renegotiations of lower-level risk limits, when the interest of the 
business requires so. This approach requires risk officers to possess considerable 
knowledge of the businesses whose risk-taking they monitor. Senior risk officers are 
keen to acquire business insight in order to voice their opinion on risk issues that are 
beyond the quantifiable risk framework. They derive strategic significance from 
influencing high-level strategic decision making by responding to the concrete 
concerns of top management at any given time. In this model, holistic risk 
management is used interactively (by top management), in the formal context of the 
risk management committee where the senior risk officers set the agenda and provide 
information for it.  
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The field perspective and the conceptual unbundling of ERM suggest that risk 
practices and risk management ideal types constitute an assembly. Similarly, distinct 
conceptual clusters have emerged in the activity management assembly (Gosselin, 
1997) and in the evolution of the balanced scorecard (Speckbacher et al. 2003). The 
proposed co-existence of four ideal types of risk management is conceptually similar 
to the existence of three levels of activity management and the distinction between 
three types of balanced scorecard.  
 
Later variants within the same assembly seem to assume a strategic role. The eventual 
aspiration to link initially confined, highly specialized or technical practices to 
strategy is a phenomenon that appears to characterize the development of not only 
ERM, but other management innovations too (c.f. activity-based costing and 
management, ‗Type III‘ balanced scorecard, strategic management accounting). 
 
The clustering of techniques within the same assembly is not merely conceptual, it 
takes place in actual organizational settings too. In practice it appears that assemblies 
of management control innovations offer practitioners opportunities for selective 
implementation, revision and switching between the different sub-groups of 
techniques within the same assembly (Gosselin, 1997). It is remarkable that given the 
empirical evidence, few ABC and BSC implementations are strategic. In contrast, the 
ERM mixes (in the case of Gotebank and Fraser Bank) did possess strategic 
significance, albeit of dissimilar nature. Gotebank‘s holistic risk management 
capability appeared as a separate development from its risk measurement practices. 
On the contrary, Fraser‘s risk-based management was strongly dependent on its risk 
silo measurement and integrated risk management capabilities. This study suggests 
that in order to realize the strategic potential of assemblies, advocates need to 
demonstrate not only technical competence, but also an ability to align their assembly 
of control practices with top management‘s predilections towards the use of different 
technologies. In particular, aligning the risk management mix with the predominant 
calculative culture of intended users played out differently in the studied settings, but 
in both cases required a great deal of political aptness on the part of risk controllers. 
Accordingly, the organizational significance of management control practices appears 
to hinge upon the organizational significance of the management control practitioner. 
 
As a reflection on the corporate governance context of risk management, it appears 
that the spectrum of risk practices suggested by COSO (2004), based on our evidence, 
falls into two clusters. On one hand, ERM by the numbers responds to the suggestion 
of ‗applying risk management in strategy setting‘ (i.e. integration with planning and 
control) and using it ‗to manage risks to be within [the firm‘s] risk appetite‘ (i.e. 
control by exception). On the other hand holistic ERM corresponds more directly to 
the design requirement that risk management should be applied ‗to identify potential 
events that may affect the entity‘ and bring those to high-level discretionary decision 
making. What corporate governance advocates need to consider in the future, is that 
these two clusters of requirements might well be contingent on (or give rise to) 
different calculative cultures. Hence ERM adherents might struggle to adopt all the 
COSO-recommended risk practices within a single firm– ERM by the numbers could 
strive where holistic ERM is frustrated, and vice versa.  
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The distinction between the two clusters can be useful in generating further empirical 
research agendas. Four such questions are outlined.  
 
The first agenda would aim to verify if the distinctions between the types of 
calculative cultures and the two diverging risk models are valid. A survey of a larger 
sample of financial institutions could be used to explore the risk management mix in 
different organizations, the patterns they take and the driving factors of the emerging 
clusters. Surveys, interpreting the responses of managers to questionnaires on their 
risk management philosophies and attitudes to risk modelling would also further 
scrutinise the concept of calculative cultures. The notion of calculative cultures might 
be applicable in other contextual analyses of management control system (MCS) 
adoptions. Reflecting on our case studies and on Bhimani (2003), I suggest that a 
given calculative culture shapes managerial predilections (or resistance) towards new 
MCS, serving as an important determinant, as well as result, of the fit between MCS 
and organizational contexts. It is likely that other variables that were not so salient in 
the present study will surface more powerfully in a larger sample study; Table 2 was 
merely suggestive of the presence of other contingencies, namely strategic pattern, 
size and age. 
 
Another research question would seek to investigate if a special case of risk 
management would still comply with the distinction between the quantitative and the 
holistic models. It is suggested that that the treatment of operational risk in the risk 
management models could be further explored. Operational risk is a particular risk 
issue that poses different challenges to the postulated risk management models. Given 
the current Basel II framework, under the definition of operational risk one finds both 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable risks. Financial institutions need to apply a rather 
loose regulatory definition to devise a set of operational risks that are relevant to 
them. With the amount of flexibility offered in Basel II, it is likely that organizations 
will cherry -pick issues for inclusion into the remit of the operational risk controller. 
Based on the distinction between the two risk management models (quantitative and 
holistic), one would expect that with time the management of operational risk will 
take different routes, depending on which ERM model it conforms to.  
 
Thirdly, further research into the dynamics of the risk management is warranted. 
Longitudinal studies are necessary to confirm the validity of the drivers that are 
associated with different risk management styles. They would also help to explore if 
the choice of interactively (or diagnostically) used risk controls is motivated by top 
management‘s assessments of the key strategic uncertainties of their organizations. 
Further, the signaling effect of internal control systems (as postulated in Simons, 
1990, 1991) could be explored in the ERM context too. We need to trace the response 
of organizational participants to the interactive use of particular risk controls. Would 
the process result in the emergence of new strategic initiatives? Studying the 
dynamics of risk management, the researcher would need to consider the interactions 
between risk and other management controls. In particular, this study suggests that 
the interface between accounting and risk controls is riddled with possibilities and 
tensions. Thus studying risk management will help us further explore strategic 
planning and performance management in organizations.  
 
Finally, it is unclear to what extent the two models of ERM are mutually exclusive. 
Do they represent a divergence in the risk management world, or are they different 
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stages in the evolution of risk management? Given the seeds of value-based 
management already sown in Gotebank, it is possible that another management team 
or a turn in the institutional pressures may bring a paradigm change in the future. 
Equally, should the VBM project fail to deliver the expectations attached to it, the 
quantitative model of risk management may get discredited in Frasers. This could 
result in yet another overhaul of the risk management function and a redefinition of 
its role. Talking of such shifts is highly speculative, even though it is likely that any 
particular risk management mix or model would be a dynamic phenomenon and 
subject to change. However, from a contingency perspective, one would argue that 
the incidents that shape the patterns in the development of risk management practices 
are systemic, rather than erratic, and can therefore be explained by careful studies of 
the underlying currents. 
 
As risk management is a rather nascent management control practice, it is not yet 
clear how it will ultimately benefit organizations that adopt it. The Basel regulators 
have built the international bank regulatory regime on the premise of continuing risk 
management developments.  On the evidence of the cases presented here, senior risk 
officers exercise a considerable amount of discretion in determining their functions‘ 
remit, subject to accommodating relevant stakeholder concerns. Academic 
researchers can usefully contribute to the debate on the regulatory, corporate 
governance, management control and accountability issues that are emerging in the 
wake of enterprise risk management.   
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS  
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS AT GOTEBANK 
 
 Interviewee’s functional position Date 
1 Head of Economic Risk Capital 26 May 2002 
2 Head of Economic Risk Capital 01 June 2002 
3 Head of Strategy & Projects 07 October 2002 
4 Director, CFO Division 07 October 2002 
5 Head of Economic Risk Capital 07 October 2002 
6 Head of Operational Risk Controlling 08 October 2002 
7 Head of Operational Risk Controlling 08 October 2002 
8 Market Risk Controlling: Team members 09 October 2002 
9 Head of ALM/Market Risk Controlling 09 October 2002 
10 Head of Market Risk Controlling 09 October 2002 
11 Head of Credit Risk Controlling 10 October 2002 
12 ERC and Capital Management 10 October 2002 
13 Head of Economic Risk Capital 10 October 2002 
14 Director, CFO Division 10 October 2002 
15 Head of Strategy & Control 11 October 2002 
16 Head of Credit Portfolio Management 11 October 2002 
17 Chief Risk Officer 14 October 2002 
18 Head of Asset Liability Management, Division X 14 October 2002 
19 Head of Financial Risk Control, Division X 14 October 2002 
20 Head of Economic Risk Capital 09 December 2002 
21 ERC and Capital Management 09 December 2002 
22 Director of Group Risk Reporting 09 December 2002 
23 Director, CFO Division 09 December 2002 
24 Head of Financial Risk Control, Division X 10 December 2002 
25 Head of Corporate Development, Division X 10 December 2002 
26 Head of Asset Liability Management, Division X 10 December 2002 
27 Head Strategy and Projects 10 December 2002 
28 Chief Risk Officer 11 December 2002 
29 Head of Credit Risk Controlling 11 December 2002 
30 Head of Operational Risk Controlling 11 December 2002 
31 Head of Market Risk Controlling 11 December 2002 
32 Director of Legal & Compliance 12 December 2002 
33 Head of Regulatory Reporting 12 December 2002 
34 Group Chief Risk Officer 13 December 2002 
35 Director of Group Risk Reporting 13 December 2002 
36 Head of Economic Risk Capital 13 December 2002 
37 Chief Risk Officer, Division X 13 December 2002 
38 Head of Financial Management, Division X 13 December 2002 
39 Head of Management of Closed Blocks, Division X 13 December 2002 
40 Head of Economic Risk Capital 01 September 2003 
41 Director of Group Risk Reporting 01 September 2003 
42 Chief Risk Officer 01 September 2003 
43 Head of Strategy & Projects 02 September 2003 
44 Head of Operational Risk Controlling 02 September 2003 
45 Head of Credit Risk Controlling 02 September 2003 
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46 Head of Strategy & Control 03 September 2003 
47 Chief Risk Officer, Division X 03 September 2003 
48 Group Chief Risk Officer 04 September 2003 
49 Director, CFO Division 04 September 2003 
50 Director, Group Financial Accounting 04 September 2003 
51 Head of Credit Portfolio Management 05 September 2003 
52 Chief Credit Officer 05 September 2003 
53 Head of Economic Risk Capital 28 September 2004 
54 Head of Operational Risk Controlling 28 September 2004 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS AT FRASER BANK 
 
 Interviewee’s functional position Date 
1 Risk Management Policy review meeting 19 October 2001 
2 Director of Risk Reporting 20 December 2001 
3 Head of Economic Capital (previous) 06 February 2002 
4 Head of Economic Capital (previous) 15 April 2002 
5 Director of Risk Reporting 10 May 2002 
6 Director of Risk Reporting 18 June 2002 
7 Assistant Director 3, Group Strategy and Planning 30 May 2002 
8 Assistant Director 2, Group Strategy and Planning 30 July 2002 
9 Director of Risk Reporting 12 September 2002 
10 Assistant Director 2, Group Strategy and Planning 23 September 2002 
11 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning 24 September 2002 
12 Head of Economic Capital 21 October 2002 
13 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning 05 November 2002 
14 Head of Economic Capital 05 November 2002 
15 Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 22 November 2002 
16 Head of Economic Capital 22 November 2002 
17 Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 27 November 2002 
18 Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 06 December 2002 
19 Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 19 June 2003 
20 Head of Economic Capital 19 June 2003 
21 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning 19 June 2003 
 
 
 
